# Lab 1: Security Audit

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### **1** System Description

The system is a low-powered Atom PC, small form factor (it is less than 12" on each side, and about 3" tall), with a 320GB hard drive and 2GB of ram. The system is located in my bedroom in a house in San Luis Obispo, on top of another computer. It is plugged into a surge protector, but not a UPS. The surge protector is shared with several other computers. The system has no input devices plugged into it (keyboard, mouse, webcam, etc).

The system is connected to the internet via a switch in my bedroom that is shared with several other desktops. The bedroom switch connects to a shared house switch via a cable that runs along the floor of the hallway leading to my bedroom. The shared workgroup switch has connects to a Linksys router running DD-WRT (linux), connected to a DSL modem (local ATT affiliate ISP).

## 2 Threat Analysis

Threat			
Power Loss	Goals violated	Availability	The system is completely unavail-
			able in the event of a power loss
		Integrity	Power loss is well known to cause
			data corruption
	Vulnerability	Random power outage (or malicious conduct) could	
		cause power loss to the system	
			Continued

Threat			
		Availability	Power outages can be mitigated by attaching the server to a UPS. There is not currently a UPS on this system.
	Controls	Integrity	Steps can be taken to ensure data integrity, such as journaling filesystems or battery backed disk cache. A journaling filesystem is currently in place (ext3) and past experience has shown that the journal is reasonably effective at preventing integrity errors.
Shared Network	Goals violated	Availability Confidentiality	A malicious or incompetent roommate can use all available resources, limiting system's access. Data on shared equipment can be snooped.
	Vulnerability	Network on which	h computer is located is untrusted.
	Controls	Availability Confidentiality	Reasonably sane QoS policies on router reduce competition for net- work resources. All sensitive data is sent and received via encrypted, and possibly authenticated channels (HTTPS, SSL, etc).
Public OpenSSH	Goals violated	Availability Confidentiality Integrity	Compromised accounts could consume system resources or damage services Compromised accounts could grant information to unathorized persons Compromised accounts could modify system configurations and data
	Vulnerability	A user account with a bad password could become compromised and allow unathorized access to the sys- tem	
	1		Continued

Threat			
	Controls	General Confidentiality	OpenSSH is configured to disal- low remote "root" login. "ssh- blackd" script monitors for re- peated failed logins (brute force attempts) and adds IPs to a "banned" iptables chain. All ad- min accounts have reasonably se- cure passwords. OpenSSH is lis- tening on a nonstandard port. Sensitive data is not publically readable via file system permis- sions, so compromised non-admin accounts are prevented from ac-
		Integrity	cessing restricted data Same as above, except read/write
		Availability	A missing computer is an unavail-
			able computer!
Theft	Goals violated	Confidentiality	With physical access to the hard- ware an attacker would have full access to any data on the system.
	Vulnerability	The system is sm	nall and unlocked. Any person who
		gains access to the home (locked external door) would	
		be able to easily take the system.	
			Continued

Threat			
		General	The house is generally locked, and roommates are trustworthy. Roommate's guests' are also gen- erally trustworthy. Strangers in the home would be confronted by roommates (assuming somebody was home.
	Controls	Availability	A lock could be placed on the sys- tem to prevent theft. Currently unlocked, and more valuable sys- tems would be higher in the pri- ority list.
		Confidentiality	Whole-disk encryption with re- quired password to unlock would protect data. Currently unused because I don't care and data on disk is not important enough to encrypt.
"Public"	Goals violated	Confidentiality	Files that are not supposed to be accessible can be made accessi- ble, either by exploit or accidental publishing of files.
Fileshares		Integrity	Read-only shares may be written to.
	Vulnerability	Samba exploits could allow access to restricted files, or allow read-only shares to be written to.	
	Controls	Confidentiality Integrity	Not much I can do here Backups to another system can ensure that a valid version of the file is always available.
Dynamic DNS	Goals violated	Availability	If DNS service goes down, or if DNS is not updated properly, the system will be unavailable except by IP address.
	Vulnerability	System is connected to the internet via a "home" DSL connection, with a dynamically assigned IP address. Dynamic DNS service is used to provide a consistent address on the internet for the system.	
	Controls	Availability	Choose a reliable DynDNS ser- vice. Purchase a static IP
			Continued

Threat			
		Availability	Compromised PCs can consume unreasonable levels of shared re-
Compromised Roommates' PCs	Goals violated	Confidentiality	unreasonable levels of shared re- sources. Compromised PCs can expose "internal"-only resources to unathorized persons.
	Vulnerability	Resources which	are supposed to be "internal" can
		be exposed if ano	ther machine on the network is com-
		promised. This by	ypasses any rules that grant internal
		machies more access than an external one.	
		General	Could hold house-wide security
			audits.
		Availability	Detect and Take down any com-
			promised machines.
	Controls	Confidentiality	Treat internal and external users
			as the same, assume that any-
			thing published for an internal
			user will be accessed by some-
			body on the outside.
		Confidentiality	Exploited IRC bot could be used
			to gain access to system re-
	Goals violated		sources.
IRC Bot		Integrity	Exploited IRC bot could change
			IRC logs or communicate as me
	Vulnerability		probably not designed with high-
		e e	It is likely that the IRC client can
		be exploited.	
		Confidentiality	Run the IRC bot as an unprivi-
			leged user to prevent access.
	Controls	Integrity	Keep backups of the logs that the
			IRC user can't touch. I'm not
			doing this because I really don't
			care.

## 3 Conclusions

Overall, I would rate the risk level of this system as "low". Almost all of the threats evaluated are known, and are mitigated in some fashion. The only publically accessible route into the system is an OpenSSH service. OpenSSH has a long (long) history of being coded by paranoid security fanatics. In addition, OpenSSH is listening on a non-standard port, which mitigates the effects of automated bots. In addition, the machine only really provides one important function, that of a source code repository for myself. Because I recently switched from subversion to git, I now have several such repositories that I sync to, so the importance of this machine has diminished.

The data on the system consists primarily of these repositories of program code and a collection of MP3s. These MP3s are backed up to other locations periodically, so their loss is not critical.

Although incompetence, maliciousness, or malfeasance on the part of my roommates could cause damage to my systems, they are all generally trustworthy in this regard. Between technical competence, and a "cold-war"-esque mutually assured self-destruction, we tend to leave each other's machines alone. I take mild precautions (local firewalls, antivirus for windows, read-only network shares) regardless, but I'm certain that none of my roommates are sitting in their rooms trying to hack me. They might as well walk into my room and steal the hardware.

In short: nothing particularly sensitive or important, the only write-only access is via OpenSSH, which is coded by paranoid security experts, and reasonably trustworthy roommates.